Judgment subjectivism is the view that x is good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that S believes, under the proper conditions, that x is good for S. In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism implies about the well-being of welfare nihilists, people who believe there are no welfare properties, or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that welfare nihilists can be benefited (...) and harmed. Judgment subjectivism is implausible because it implies otherwise. (shrink)

According to subjectivism about ill-being, the token states of affairs that are basically bad for you must be suitably connected, under the proper conditions, to your negative attitudes. This article explores the prospects for this family of theories and addresses some of its challenges. This article (i) shows that subjectivism about ill-being can be derived from a more general doctrine that requires a negatively valenced relationship between any welfare subject and the token states that are of basic harm to that (...) subject and (ii) responds to some objections, including the objection that subjectivists about ill-being cannot plausibly explain the badness of pain. (shrink)

The influence of historiography on aspects of political thought in France, Italy and Germany. In recent years the overlap between political thought and historiography has changed the boundaries of intellectual history. Donald Kelley, the longtime editor of The Journal of the History of Ideas has played a leading part in this process. These essays by his friends and former students follow in his footsteps. The collection is divided into three parts: France, England [six essays], and Italy and Germany [four (...) essays]. Anthony Grafton and John Salmon provide an introduction, and the volume concludes with a bibliography of Donald Kelley's many works. Historians and Ideologues is designed for those with an interest in the contribution of historiography to political thought, and will be a timely addition to the growing reaction against the postmodern scepticism in historiographical research in this field. Contributors include Ann Blair, Julian Franklin, Kathleen Parrow, David Harris Sacks, Sarah Hanley, Daniel Woolf, Gordon Schochet, Joseph Levine, John Pocock, Perez Zagorin, William Connell, Donald Phillip Verene, and Michael Carhart. Anthony Grafton is a Professor in the Department of History at Princeton University. John Salmon is the Marjorie Walter Goodheart Emeritus Professor of History at Bryn Mawr College. (shrink)

Although the precise function of utrophin at the postsynaptic membrane of the neuromuscular junction still remains unclear, despite recent genetic ‘knockout’ experiments(1,2), a separate study in a transgenic mouse model system for Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD) has nonetheless shown that overexpression of utrophin into extrasynaptic regions of muscle fibers can functionally compensate for the lack of dystrophin and alleviate the muscle pathology(3). In this context, the next step is to identify the mechanisms presiding over expression of utrophin at the neuromuscular (...) synapse in attempts to induce its expression throughout DMD muscle fibers. In fact, additional studies have shown that an important DNA element contained with the utrophin promoter may confer synapse‐specific expression to the utrophin gene(4,5). Identification of the events culminating in the transaction of the utrophin gene within synaptic myonuclei should provide important cues for the development of an effective therapeutic strategy for DMD. (shrink)

Today’s business students are tomorrow’s business leaders. To ensure they have skills in creating profitable, pro-social, ethical organizations, we need to consider alternative methods of teaching CSR. In this proposed symposium, we will present different approaches to international CSR/Service-Learning.

Stillbirths are largely excluded from international measures of mortality and morbidity. Zeshan Qureshi and colleagues argue that stillbirth should be higher on the global health agenda.

Koonin argues that CRISPR-Cas systems present the best-known case in point for Lamarckian evolution because they satisfy his proposed criteria for the specific inheritance of acquired adaptive characteristics. We see two interrelated issues with Koonin’s characterization of CRISPR-Cas systems as Lamarckian. First, at times he appears to confuse an account of the CRISPR-Cas system with an account of the mechanism it employs. We argue there is no evidence for the CRISPR-Cas system being “Lamarckian” in any sense. Second, it is unclear (...) whether the mechanism is more “Lamarckian” than many other forms of genetic change already well-characterized in Darwinian terms. We present three conceptually distinct senses in which the mechanism of IAC may be considered Lamarckian and argue that only the strongest sense of goal-directed IAC would be difficult to accommodate in a Darwinian account. As the CRISPR-Cas mechanism does not qualify as “Lamarckian” in this strong sense, we argue there is no conceptual value in calling it “Lamarckian”. Finally, we suggest that CRISPR-Cas systems do hold the potential for genuinely non-Darwinian, directed evolution in a way that Koonin did not discuss, involving their potential use as a human gene-editing tool. (shrink)

Do the rich descriptions and narrative shapings of literature provide a valuable resource for readers, writers, philosophers, and everyday people to imagine and confront the ultimate questions of life? Do the human activities of storytelling and complex moral decision-making have a deep connection? What are the moral responsibilities of the artist, critic, and reader? What can religious perspectives—from Catholic to Protestant to Mormon—contribute to literary criticism? Thirty well known contributors reflect on these questions, including iterary theorists Marshall Gregory, James Phelan, (...) and Wayne Booth; philosophers Martha Nussbaum, Richard Hart, and Nina Rosenstand; and authors John Updike, Charles Johnson, Flannery O'Connor, and Bernard Malamud. Divided into four sections, with introductory matter and questions for discussion, this accessible anthology represents the most crucial work today exploring the interdisciplinary connections between literature, religion and philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From the Executive EditorDonald R. KelleyTwenty years ago the Journal of the History of Ideas moved from Temple University to the University of Rochester (through the efforts especially of J. Paul Hunter, then dean of the college of arts and sciences, and Lewis White Beck, professor of philosophy), and I replaced Philip Wiener, who had been editor for forty-five years, the first issue under my supervision being that of (...) July 1985. A year later Robin Ladrach joined me as assistant and then as associate editor, and in 1991 we both moved along with the JHI to Rutgers University (through the efforts especially of Richard McCormick, then dean of the faculty of arts and sciences and now president of the university). Now the Journal has moved to the University of Pennsylvania, and I pass on the editorship to a committee composed of Warren Breckman, Martin J. Burke, Anthony Grafton, and Ann E. Moyer, with Robin Ladrach continuing as managing editor.We changed our face in 1990, but otherwise we have maintained a remarkably steady course since the days of Arthur O. Lovejoy, original founder of the JHI in 1940, with articles submitted and articles published continuing in mostly the same quantity and intellectual range and following the interdisciplinary and cross-cultural vision established by Lovejoy in the 1930s (history of philosophy, science, political thought, historiography, religion, literature, art, and music) but also modified by intervening intellectual and cultural changes (and so enhanced by studies in the human sciences, gender, women's history, globalism, animals, etc.). Such change has for the most part not been from conscious editorial policy, except indirectly, but rather "from below," and the role of the editor has been that not of cultural critic but of observer, whose reflections have appeared in "Horizons of Intellectual History," JHI, 48 (1987), 143–69; "What is Happening to the History of Ideas?" JHI, 51 (1990), 3–25; "JHI 2000," JHI, 61 (2000), 153–56; and The History of Ideas: Canon and Variations (Rochester, N.Y., 1990), which contains also the reflections of Lovejoy and other earlier authors. The new regime may well introduce new departures, but I [End Page 475] believe that it will continue to rely and perhaps draw on the old Lovejovian tradition which has made this journal a successful and enduring international enterprise.Donald R. KelleyExecutive Editor Emeritus Rutgers UniversityCopyright © 2005 The Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.... (shrink)

Reason has reasons of which ‘reason’ knows nothing. It was this essential insight, along with the methodological prioritisation of a phenomenology of cognition and the recognition of the epistemological distinctiveness of judgment, that a young Bernard Lonergan gleaned from his study of John Henry Newman's Grammar of Assent. Given that the ‘later’, post‐Insight (1953) Lonergan enacted a more explicit transposition of his thought into a hermeneutical and existential framework, one might be tempted to assume that this coincided with a (...) drift away from his tutelage under the nineteenth‐century Englishman. Indeed, an examination of the secondary literature detailing their relationship would suggest as much. Yet, in the hope of contributing to the regrettably sparse Newman‐Lonergan scholarship and proposing a modest recalibration therein, I argue that the more existential, hermeneutical, and committed to the philosophical turn to concrete socio‐historical subjectivity Lonergan grew, the more fruit his early Newmanian formation bore. By analysing Newman's proto‐Lonerganian anticipations in the areas of self‐appropriation, conversion, the relationship of subjectivity to objectivity, and the hermeneutical nature of consciousness, I will contend that Newman—a presciently continental mind writing as one untimely born into an analytical milieu—was the wellspring from which Lonergan never ceased to draw. (shrink)

While the United Nations Principles of Responsible Management Education are a very positive development in the horizon of management education over the last decade, there are still many significant challenges for engaging the mind of the manager in ways that will foster the values of PRME and the UN Global Compact. Responsible management education must address three foundational challenges in business education if it is to actualize the aspirations of PRME: it must confront the cognitional myth that knowing is like (...) looking, it must move beyond mere analysis to systems thinking, and it must transition from a values-neutral stance to a values-driven stance. Using Developing Sustainable Strategies, an MBA practicum in the Sustainable Management Concentration at DePaul University’s Kellstadt Graduate School of Business as a case study, this article identifies the ways in which Pragmatic Inquiry can address these challenges. The method of Pragmatic Inquiry prepares students to become responsible managers, to develop sustainable strategies, and to be creators of shared value. Built from the philosophical foundations of American pragmatism and Bernard Lonergan’s critical realism, Pragmatic Inquiry is an effective method and pedagogy for responsible management education. (shrink)

A magisterial exploration of poetry’s place in the fine arts by one of the twentieth century's leading poets In this book, eminent poet Anthony Hecht explores the art of poetry and its relationship to the other fine arts. While the problems he treats entail both philosophic and theoretical discussion, he never allows abstract speculation to overshadow his delight in the written texts that he introduces, or in the specific examples of painting and music to which he refers. After discussing (...) literature’s links with painting and music, Hecht investigates the theme of paradise and wilderness, especially in Shakespeare’s The Tempest. He then turns to the question of public and private art, exploring the ways in which all the arts participate in balances between private and public modes of discourse, and between an exclusive or elitist role and the openly political. Beginning with a discussion of architecture as an illustration of a more general theme of discord and balance, the penultimate lecture probes the inner contradictions of works of art and our reactions to them, while the final piece concerns art and morality. (shrink)

A collection of essays from some of the world's leading intellectual historians, representing an international spectrum of research into the history of philosophy, intellect, science and music. This collection of essays addresses, in specific historical ways and from particular disciplinary standpoints, the problem of knowledge and what used to be called the classification of the sciences. What is, or what passes for, knowledge? What are its divisions, and how should they be related? Who possesses this knowledge, and to what uses (...) has it been put? How is it transmitted, and how can its history be understood and written? Ranging across the epistemological barrier formed by the revolution of modern science, these contributions inquire into the changing disciplinary patterns of the tumultuous times between the renaissance and the enlightenment, that saw the fragmentation of old ideals and the creation of European modernity. Contributors: Donald R. Kelley, Ann Blair, Paul Nelles, Constance Blackwell, Ulrich Schneider, Martin Mulsow, J.B. Schneewind, Donald Verene, Peter Miller, Ann Moyers, Michael Seidler, Anthony Pagden, Paula Findlen, Anthony Grafton, Heikki Mikkeli, Nicholas Jardine, Londa Schiebinger. (shrink)

This paper examines the case of Lawrence v. Texas to bring out the philosophical commitments of Justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia. It is proposed that Justices Kennedy and Scalia, while both Catholics, represent fundamentally different visions of the “ends and reasons” of democratic law. A close reading of the Justices’ opinions in Lawrence indicates that Justice Scalia belongs to the tradition of the “ancients” and Justice Kennedy to the tradition of the “moderns.” The paper focuses in particular on (...) the Justices’ interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is claimed that the interpretation of this clause turns on a philosophical commitment regarding the ends and reasons that the Constitution should be understood to serve, and thus that justices cannot help acting as “philosopher kings” here. Which of the two Justices is more consistent with the Catholic tradition is proposed as a question for another day. (shrink)

Despite a growing literature on identity theory in the last two decades, much of its current use in archaeology is still driven toward locating and dating static categories such as 'Phoenician,' 'Christian' or 'native.' Previous studies have highlighted the various problems and challenges presented by identity, with the overall effect of deconstructing it to insignificance. As the humanities and social sciences turn to material culture, archaeology provides a unique perspective on the interaction between people and things over the long term. (...) This volume argues that identity is worth studying not despite its slippery nature, but because of it. Identity can be seen as an emergent property of living in a material world, an ongoing process of becoming which archaeologists are particularly well suited to study. The geographic and temporal scale of the papers included is purposefully broad to demonstrate the variety of ways in which archaeology is redefining identity. Research areas span from the Great Lakes to the Mediterranean, with case studies from the Mesolithic to the contemporary world by emerging voices in the field. The volume contains a critical review of theories of identity by the editors, as well as a response and afterword by A. Bernard Knapp"--From publisher's website. (shrink)

The articles on ‘thinking’ by Gilbert Ryle brought together by Konstantin Kolenda were not very well received, even by those who acknowledge, as awhole generation of philosophers must, a considerable intellectual debt to him. Bernard Williams in his review ‘Ryle Remembered’ ) seemed to capture the general impression created by the book. My suspicion is that this was so because readers approached it with a resistance built up over years of hearingRyle flounder on the topic. They read the book (...) expecting to find nothing init that they had not already assimilated or rejected. To pick up the metaphor G. E. L. Owen employed in the obituary he wrote for the Aristotelian Society, they had come to regard Ryle's work as a philosophical seam which during his own lifetime had already been so extensively and profitably minedthat by the time of his death it was already producing diminishing returns. Although Williams in his review did provide a rationale for Ryle's floundering I suspect that his rationale, like most readers’ expectations, preventedhim from reading the articles in the volume at all closely. Williams's viewwas that towards the end of his life, with whatever he had had in the way of theory collapsing around him, Ryle was left with nothing but his massive common sense together with the resources of a style of writing which had bythen become a caricature of itself. As against this I shall argue that Ryle, puzzled by the notion of thinking, took the problem back to his own philosophical roots where he finally came to think that the solution lay. (shrink)

The book addresses the climate change crisis through scientific, historical and spiritual lenses. Using Lonergan's functional specialization method,it analyzes data to rebut the claims of climate change deniers. It seeks to motivate and coordinate needed action by persons, groups and nations. Lonergan's method helps us study the past with a view to change the future.

In 2009 I participated in a symposium, “Toward a Common Morality,” held at the United Nations Building in New York, that reflected the growing interest among scientists and philosophers in showing that science—particularly neuroscience—provides a foundation, not only for understanding morality, but also for improving it. In this essay I shall examine three books that are part of this trend: Experiments in Ethics, by Kwame Anthony Appiah; The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, by Sam Harris; and (...) Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality, by Patricia S. Churchland. These three books put forward quite different perspectives about the relationship between science and morality, which suggests that neuroscience has nothing to add to our understanding of morality as a code of conduct that everyone should follow. However, neuroscience may help explain why some people behave as they do in situations that call for moral decisions or judgments. (shrink)

La publication de The Anatomy of Melancoly de Robert Burton en 1621 marque un tournant dans l’histoire de cette célèbre maladie, déjà analysée dans le Problème XXX du corpus aristotélicien. Burton, en effet, ne se contentait pas de construire une sorte d’encyclopédie du savoir philosophique et médical sur la mélancolie, qu’il considérait comme la quintessence de toutes les maladies ; il en proposait aussi de nouvelles interprétations, notamment en abordant la mélancolie sous l’angle de ses co..

'This is a powerful piece of advocacy. I'd pick Ewing and Gearty for my counsels any day.' -Bernard Porter, LRBThis book is an account of the struggle for civil liberties against the State in which groups such as the anti-war protestors, the Irish nationalists, the Communist party, trade unionists, and the unemployed workers' movement found themselves involved in the first half of the twentieth century. All had to fight for their civil liberties in the face of strong opposition from (...) the State, including the judges whose attitude to civil liberties was often deeply hostile, and at odds with their supposed role as defenders of freedom. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan's impressive recent defence of the embodied mind theory of personal identity in his highly acclaimed work The Ethics of Killing has undoubtedly reawakened belief that physical continuity is a necessary component of the relation that matters in our self-interested concern for the future. My aim in this paper is to resist this belief in a somewhat roundabout way. I want to address this belief in a somewhat roundabout way by revisiting a classic defence of the belief that enormous (...) changes in the contents of a person's psychology does not preclude justified fear of future pain. I have in mind Bernard Williams' The Self and the Future (1970) in which he argues, against the psychological view, that physical continuity is necessary for survival. I examine Williams' second thought experiment which ostensibly supports that intuition and afterwards defend two related claims. First, I argue that a close examination of the second thought experiment reveals that one's prior commitments to a particular criterion of personal identity can influence one's response to that thought experiment. Second, I argue that Williams' second thought experiment is set out in questionbegging terms. I do not claim, however, that the intuition under consideration lacks justification; I only claim that Williams' second thought experiment does not provide the needed support. (shrink)

At M. Bernard's I saw several magnificent paintings on porcelain by Monsieur Constantin. In two hundred years, Raphael's frescoes will be known only through Monsieur Constantin.Stendhal, Voyage en France, 1837If we compare the forms that the act of copying has assumed in various civilizations, we cannot fail to notice that a certain number of phenomena are specific to European culture since the Renaissance. Perhaps one of the most singular of these phenomena is the will to create and to possess (...) imperishable reproductions of works that have been singled out, at a given moment, as the brightest jewels of Western art. The history of the fortune of Graeco-Roman sculptures has been masterfully related by Francis Haskell and Nicholas Penny in Taste and the Antique: The Lure of Classical Sculpture 1500-1900, even if it would no doubt be worthwhile to give further consideration to the critical fortune of materials used for reproduction, and particularly to the particular prestige attached to bronze—from the Mantuan works of Antico to the reconstitutions of Greek Urbilder in bronze, instead of the plaster used earlier, which were executed at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as the two Doryphoros that Georg Römer realized from various ancient marble copies of Polyclitus's athlete. But, in fact, it was not only in modern Europe that copies were made in bronze. The production of copies using this alloy was particularly prevalent in imperial China after the rediscovery, in the second half of the eleventh century of our era, of a collection of archaic bronzes from the Shang era. This is why I prefer to call attention to a practice that appears to me, in contrast, to be unique to the Western world: the copying of renowned paintings in materials that are supposed to defy time. (shrink)

Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one’s belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying (...) on an overly pragmatic account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. Instead, I suggest that the sources of basic epistemic justification are those belief-forming methods which are indispensable for zetetically indispensable projects, that is, projects which are constitutive of being a successful inquirer for embodied, agential creatures like ourselves. (shrink)

Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing—knowledge which appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than (...) follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity. (shrink)

Bare plural generic sentences pervade ordinary talk. And yet it is extremely controversial what semantics to assign to such sentences. In this paper, I achieve two tasks. First, I develop a novel classification of the various standard uses to which bare plurals may be put. This “variety data” is important—it gives rise to much of the difficulty in systematically theorizing about bare plurals. Second, I develop a novel account of bare plurals, the radical account. On this account, all bare plurals (...) fail to express propositions. The content of a bare plural has to be pragmatically “completed” by a speaker in order for her to make an assertion. At least the content of a quantifier expression has to be supplied. But sometimes, the content of a sentential operator or modal verb is also supplied. The radical account straightforwardly explains the variety data: Speakers’ communicative intentions vary wildly across different contexts. (shrink)

With a new foreword by Jonathan Lear 'Remarkably lively and enjoyable…It is a very rich book, containing excellent descriptions of a variety of moral theories, and innumerable and often witty observations on topics encountered on the way.' -_ Times Literary Supplement_ Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Drawing on (...) the ideas of the Greek philosophers, Williams reorients ethics away from a preoccupation with universal moral theories towards ‘truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life’. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. This edition also includes a commentary on the text by A.W.Moore. At the time of his death in 2003, Bernard Williams was hailed by the Times as 'the outstanding moral philosopher of his age.' He taught at the Universities of Cambridge, Berkeley and Oxford and is the author of many influential books, including _Morality; Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry_ and _Truth and Truthfulness_. (shrink)